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DALE B. THOMPSON*

Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis:
Institutional Transaction Costs and

Regulation of Water Quality
ABSTRACT
Environmental policies are significantly affected by political,
administrative,and legal institutions. These institutionsalso have
very substantialtransactioncosts associatedwith them. BenefitCost Analysis, as traditionallypracticed,pays little attention to
these transactioncosts. This article presents a cost-effectiveness
framework for carefully consideringthe institutionaltransaction
costs of policies. This article then performs a comparison of two
water qualitypolicies:a non-tradeableeffluent limit permit policy
and an effluent chargespolicy. This comparison demonstratesthat
these institutional transaction costs indeed are significant.
However,while it is important to consider these costs, they remain
very dfficult to estimate,and additionalrefinements arenecessary.
Ever since the presidency of Ronald Reagan, Benefit-Cost Analysis
(BCA) has played a significant role in environmental regulations. Under
Executive Orders 12,291' (by Reagan) and 12,8662 (by President William
Clinton), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to
perform BCA whenever it implements an environmental regulation.
Concerning the regulation of water quality, the 104th Congress attempted
to make the role of BCA even more significant. Based on the principles of
the "Contract with America," the House of Representatives passed a bill for
reauthorizing the Clean Water Act (CWA).3 This bill, along with another
bill passed by the House,' would have required more than the use of BCA
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University. I would like to thank Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Timothy F. Bresnahan, A. Mitchell
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in implementing water quality regulations; these regulations would have
to be justified by this BCA.' However, these House bills were not enacted.
The 105th Congress has also failed to reauthorize the CWA, and so the next
Congress will also have to face the question on the role of BCA in water
quality regulation.
A number of critics have decried the use of BCA in environmental
regulations.' These critiques suggest that BCA is not acceptable because it
does not seem possible to compare seemingly quantifiable costs7 with nonquantifiable benefits of these policies. Many also object to BCA's lack of
consideration in equity issues.
In addition to these critiques, BCA is also deficient from an
economic perspective. As it is generally practiced, BCA fails to consider
the costs of the institutions that support public policies. In this article, these
costs are labeled institutionaltransactioncosts, and they include the costs of
enacting a. policy by the legislature, implementing that policy by an
administrative agency, and enforcing that policy by the agency and the
courts.
In the context of environmental policies, these costs are frequently
extremely significant. By not considering them, BCA gives an incomplete
view of the social costs of these policies. This may lead to an erroneous
conclusion in comparing the economic impacts of different policies.
In this article, a framework is described that would allow policy
makers to go beyond BCA by enabling them to properly consider
institutional transaction costs. Through this framework, we can begin to
construct estimates of these costs to determine their significance.
This article then offers an example of using this framework in a
comparison of point-source water quality policies and compares a
technology-based nontradeable effluent limit permit policy such as is used
in the United States under the existing CWA, with an effluent charges
policy such as was used by the Federal Republic of Germany. This
comparison suggests that we can begin to assess the relevance of institu-

Co
.
5. For further discussion, se Cm ESnstein,
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L RBV. 247 (1996).
6.
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See, e.g., William B. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and

Environmental Deckimnakng, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 191 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, CostBenefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique,33 STAN. L REV. 387 (1981); Thomas 0.
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tional transaction costs in environmental policies. However, significant
uncertainties remain in many of the estimates, and this suggests that
substantial further research is necessary. Nevertheless, these estimates
suggest that institutional transaction costs are extremely significant in
water quality policies. Therefore, Congress should go beyond BCA and
more closely examine the consequences of institutional transaction costs
during the process of reauthorization of the Clean Water Act.
I. AN INSTITUTIONAL TRANSACTION COST FRAMEWORK
In a previous article, the author developed a framework for
comparing environmental policies that enabled consideration of institutional transaction costs' This framework resulted from the integration of
two threads of literature in law and economics. The first thread is
concerned with optimal penalties and expenditure on enforcement It is
represented by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell's "Enforcement
Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines." ° In this paper,
Polinsky and Shavell add a wealth constraint to the imposition of penalties.
They then analyze the effects on social welfare of different penalties and
enforcement costs. Under certain conditions, they can determine socially
optimal penalties and enforcement costs.
The second thread is concerned with the decision by a legislature
to enact a piece of regulation in the form of a rule versus in the form of a
standard. A rule provides bright-line distinctions to clearly identify
whether a party is in compliance with the regulation, whereas a standard
provides criteria to weigh to determine whether a party is in compliance.
This thread is represented by Louis Kaplow's "Rules versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis." In his paper, Kaplow notes that there is a significant
tradeoff between rules and standards written by legislatures. The
determination of whether a rule or a standard is socially efficient depends
on whether the social costs of drafting a rule are greater than the social
costs of interpreting a standard, given the particular nature of the problem
addressed by the policy.
In the author's earlier article, these two literatures were integrated
to develop a comparative policy analysis framework that enabled us to
consider the transaction costs of institutions that support policies.u To

9.

Frameworkfor PublicPolicy
See Dale B. Thompson, The Institutional-Transaction-Cost

Analysis, (April 14,1998) (Olin School of Business at Washington University Working Paper

on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude
and Probabilityof Fines, 35 J.L & ECON. 133 (1992).

11. Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards:an Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 1. 557 (1992).
12.

See e.g., Thompson, supra

note 9.
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simplify the analysis, a cost-effectiveness framework was created. Because
of the integration of law and economic theories, this framework is not
susceptible to the many critiques of BCA related to the difficulties of
measuring the benefits of these policies.
This is accomplished by assuming that in comparing policies,
variables are adjusted so that the policies achieve the same result. For
instance, consider the case where we compare one policy for reducing
nitrogen oxide emissions by regulating electric utilities versus another that
regulated automobiles. Assume that the first policy reduced emissions by
200 tons per year. To achieve equivalence, we then could adjust the
requirements for emissions equipment and for the inspection of automobiles, until we achieve the same reductions of 200 tons per year.
Now, because these policies achieve the same outcome, the
"benefits" of these policies are equivalent. In a comparative setting, these
equivalent benefits will cancel each other out of consideration.' What
remains in comparing the policies is to examine the costs of each, and
determine which achieves the specific result at the lowest cost.
The costs of the policy include those of complying with the
regulation by the regulated party, along with the institutional transaction
costs. In environmental policies, compliance with regulations leads to what
are generally known as "abatement costs." These are considered by BCA,
but institutional costs generally are not. To further simplify the analysis,
the institutional transaction costs are decomposed into four components:
Enactment Costs, Implementation Costs, Detection Costs, and Prosecution
Costs. Enactment costs are those associated with enacting a policy by the
legislature; implementation costs are those associated with implementing
a policy by an administrative agency; detection costs are those of detecting
violations of a policy; and prosecution costs are those of dealing with
violators of a policy or parties who challenge a policy in courts.
Then, rather than comparing the total cost of one policy with
another, we will first compare policies over each individual cost component. When the policies entail the same costs for a particular component,
they will cancel each other out, and need not be estimated. When the
policies differ, we must construct estimates of their differences. The
framework also provides suggestions on the construction of these
estimates.
After we have estimates for the differences between the policies
across each cost component, we combine them to determine which policy

13. However, if an analyst is determined to compare two policies with different results,
adjustments to the framework can be done to enable this. This will, however, require the
contentious estimation of differential benefits between the policies.
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is more cost-effective. At this point, we can also conduct sensitivity analysis
to examine the effects of different assumptions on our conclusion.

II. A COMPARISON OF TWO POINT-SOURCE WATER QUALITY
POLICIES
A sample comparison will best demonstrate how to use the
framework described above. This section will compare two different
regulatory structures to reduce surface water pollution by point sources
adopted in the United States and in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
during the 1970s. These two structures are a technology-based
nontradeable-effluent-limit-permit (NELP) system and an effluent charges
system. This comparison will consider the effects of these structures with
respect to one industry, textile mills.14
Many economists have recommended economic-incentive-based
systems like an effluent charge system rather than performance-based
systems like a nontradeable permit system."5 Similar to BCA in general,
these economists have failed to consider the effects of institutional
transaction costs (ITC) on the desirability of incentive-based systems. In
this comparison, it can be seen that ITC are indeed very significant in these
policies, and should not be ignored. The comparison will begin with a
description of the relevant institutional features of these systems.
A. Technology-Based Nontradeable-Effluent-Limit-Permit System
Under the 1972 CWA and the 1977 amendments to it, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was charged with the duty
of determining effluent-limit-permit levels for a variety of pollutants, for
each of more than 50 industries.1 These levels were to be represented in
terms of concentration of conventional' pollutants such as biochemical
oxygen demand, total suspended solids, pH, and toxic pollutants. 7 Further,
these levels would be based upon the correct operation and maintenance
of technological guidelines known as "best available technology" or

14. This industry was chosen because the author had good access to the history of
regulations for this industry.
15. See, e.g., ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICS, AM PUBLIC
POLICY (1975); FREDERICK I ANDERSON ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH
EcONOMIc INcENTIVES (1977); ROBERT N. STAVINS, PROJECF 88. HARNESSING MARKET FORCES

To PROTECT OUR ENVmONMEN
16.

INITIATIVES FOR OUR NEW PRESIDENT (1988).

See ROBERT PERCIVAL Er AL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY, 894-95,912 (1992).
17. See JOSEPH L SAxEr AL, LBGALCONTROLOF WATER RESOURCES, 929-30 (2d ed. 1991).
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"BAT."" s The EPA would also determine what technologies and operating
procedures would meet the BAT requirements. The process of determining
the BAT classifications and the associated effluent-limitation guidelines for
almost all of these industries took from 1973 to 1990.19 These guidelines can
be challenged in courts when they are announced, and they almost always
are." During these procedures, the actions of the administrative agency are
examined to see whether it complied with its mandate. One of the most
frequent sources of contention is the economic analyses that were done in
support of the selection of particular technologies as the basis for the
effluent limit guidelines.
After this implementation process, the NELP system operates by
applying these BAT guidelines to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits issued by the EPA and participating state
agencies. Before any point source may discharge effluent into a water body,
it must obtain one of these permits.1 These permits are generally valid for
five years.' The conditions of these permits are generally in terms of a total
amount of conventional and toxic pollutants. These total amounts are
found by multiplying the NELP concentration guidelines by the amount of
discharge flow allowed by the agency issuing the permit. In determining
the amount of discharge flow, the agency could consider the site-specific
effects such as "hot spots" for pollutant levels. A permit is issued when the
agency is assured that a facility will be able to comply with the terms of the
permit based on the existence and operation of relevant control technologies.3 These technologies do not necessarily have to be the ones upon
which the effluent guidelines are based. Individual facilities may choose
their own particular abatement technique as long as they comply with the
levels listed in their permits.
After the permit is issued, the individual facility is required to
monitor its discharges for the different listed pollutants and submit
monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports.15 These reports are supplemented
by an annual audit of the facility's discharges and practices by the

18.

These guidelines actually have many more technological classifications with their

respective acronyms. However, for our purposes, the most significant of these classifications,

"BAT," will suffice.
19.

See PaECVAL T AL, supra note 16, at 894,912.

20. See id. at 896-97.
21.

See SAX r AL, supra note 17, at 928.

22. See id.
23.

Interview with Richard Langford, Regulatory Affairs Manager, Hoescht-Celanese,

in Narrows, Va. (Mar. 25,1996).
24. See id.
25.

See Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory

Enfircement: The Case of IndustrialEffluent Standards,33 J.L & BOON. 331, 337 (1990).
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regulating agency. If a facility is consistently violating the levels in its
permits, enforcement steps are taken by the regulating agency.' The
agency has the power to fine the facility, or revoke the permit. However,
these steps are infrequently taken. The more common action is to send an
informal notice of violation letter (NOV).27 If the violations continue, the
normal response is for the agency to contact the facility to determine what
steps they are taking to alleviate the problem, and to work with the facility
in getting it back into compliance.' This process may go on for several
years.
Instead of cooperating with the agency, a facility may also challenge the levels in its permits in court. Appeals to courts also frequently
result from the imposition of more formal penalties by the agency.Y
B. Effluent Charge System
The FRG initiated and operated an effluent charge system during
the 1970s and 1980s. Gardner Brown and Ralph Johnson wrote about this
system in "Pollution Control by Effluent Changes: It Works in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Why Not in the U.S."' The following discussion
derives completely from interpretation of this paper.
In 1976, the Effluent Charge Law (ECL) was passed in the FRG.31
The effluent charge system mandated by this law went into effect after
1979. Under this system, discharge permits for point sources describe the
process of calculating the charges paid by each facility.13 These charges are
based on the expected discharge flows and concentrations of suspended
solids, biochemical oxygen demand, and other toxic Chemicals.'
The permit also includes references to federal minimum standards
for the concentrations of these pollutants. Under the ECL, these minimum
standards are based on determination of performance under best practicable technology.' These determinations are done under the provisions of
another federal water law.' For the purposes of this comparison, it will be

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 337-38.
See id.
See Langford, supranote 23.
See Magat & Viscusi, supra note 25, at 338-39.
Gardner Brown & Ralph Johnson, PollutionControlby Effluent Changes:It Works in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Why Not in the U.S., 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 929 (1984).
31. See id. at 933.
32. See id. at 944.
33. See id. at 933-34.
34. See id. at 934.
35. See id. at 933.
36. See id.
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assumed that these minimum standards are not based on technology3 7
Rather, they are based on "safe" levels of discharges. The determination of
safe levels of discharge is the first step in the determination of technologybased effluent limitations. After safe levels are determined, different
technologies are examined to see which one is best and whether it is
economically feasible to achieve these levels using these technologies. This
assumption essentially means that the determination of these minimum
standards does not include these later steps.
The importance of these minimum standards derives from their
effect on the total amount of charges paid by the facility. When the
expected concentrations of all of the relevant pollutants are below these
minimum standards, the total charges bill for the individual facility is
reduced by 50 percentOs For purposes of this article, it will be assumed that
these charges are reduced instead by 25 percent.,
The permit also requires monitoring of the discharges by the
facilities themselves.' If actual discharges are consistently above the
expected levels in the permits, the amount the facility owes will be adjusted
accordingly.1 State agencies also zoccasionally audit the facilities' discharges
and their monitoring practices.
The facilities are expected to pay their charges, with one exception.
There is a "hardship clause" in the ECL.' Under this clause, individual
facilities or entire industries may apply for an exemption to the federal
Minister of the Interior for part or all of the charges bill." They need to
show that payment of their charges bill presents a particular hardship.'
This enforcement option increasesthe political desirability of this system."
Thus, under the modified effluent charges system, the amount of
fees paid by an individual facility depends on the following: the per unit

37. This assumption is to further differentiate these systems, thereby sharpening this
comparison. One can also argue that because these are already determined under a different
law, their marginal costs in the ECL are zero. Meanwhile, we could also use the framework
to identify the tradeoffs between the charges system using technology-based minimum

standards, versus the modified charges system.
38. See id.
at 935-36.
39. Combined with other assumptions made, a 50 percent reduction in charges leads to
a situation where there is no substitution of abatement activities by low-cost firms for
activities by high-cost firms. This lack of substitution defeats the point of having an effluent
charges system. Hence, a reduction of charges that is less is considered.
40. See Brown & Johnson, supm note 30, at 934.
41. See id.
at 937.
42. See id. at 94849.
43. See id. at 937.
44. Seeid.
45. See id.
46. Seeid.
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charges rate, the quantity of discharges, whether the discharges are at or
below the "minimum standard," the reduction multiplier for facilities
meeting the minimum standard, and whether that facility qualifies for an
exemption under the hardship clause.
C. Comparing the Technology-Based NELP System with the Effluent
Charges System for the Textile Mill Industry
To compare a permits system with an effluent charges system, we
will first specify the policy outcome that each system will achieve. We will
then compare the permits system with the charges system across each of
the different cost components of the ITC framework, individually. These
components are compliance costs, enactment costs, agency implementation
costs, detection costs, and prosecution costs. We will then collect these
individual comparisons and see which policy is a more cost effective means
towards reaching our goal.
1. Determining the Policy Outcome for the Textile Mill Industry under Both

Systems
The industry we will examine is the textile mill industry. Textile
mills do a variety of activities:
1. receiving and preparing fibers
2. transforming fibers into yam, thread or webbing
3. converting the yam and web into fabric or related

products, and
4. producing transitional products or final consumer
products such as thread, yam, bolt fabric, hosiery,

towels, sheets, or carpet.'
There are approximately 250 large, direct-discharging textile mills in the

United States. Most of these are in the Mid-Atlantic and southern regions
of the country4 These firms discharge a variety of toxic, conventional, and
non-conventional pollutants.' Toxic pollutants include 17 organic and 11

metallic products; conventional pollutants include the biochemical oxygen
demand, total suspended solids, oil and grease, and pH; and
47. See UNroD STAT1S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTcrIO AGENCY, PROPOSED EPLUENT
GUIDEUNEM RULDAAM FOR THE THE MILS POINT SOURCE CATEGORY (1979) [hereinafter
PROPOSED GUMINEsI.
48. Telephone Interview with Allan Wad, EnvirnmmtalEngineer, RMT Hydroedence,

(July 12,1996).
49. See PROPOSED GUDIMES, supra note 47.
50. See id.
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nonconventional pollutants include chemical oxygen demand and color.51
In total, the industry produces approximately $40 billion in product each
year (as of 1980).'
The policy goal that we will try to achieve will be the reduction of
biodegradeable materials effluent by textile mills under the effluent
guidelines from the permit system. Table 1 shows the biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD) effluent limitation guidelines developed by the EPA for
textile mills, along with prior median values.' From table 1, it can be seen
that the amount of reduction of BOD, which is called for by the effluent
limitations, is very substantial. The total amount of influent product
wastewater flows for the industry is approximately three-quarters of a
billion pounds of product per year.' Complying with these guidelines,
total annual effluent of biodegradeable material is equal to approximately
three-quarters of a million pounds. Thus, average effluent of
biodegradeable material for an individual direct-discharging mill would be
approximately 3,000 pounds per year.
As was discussed above, because this ITC framework is a costeffectiveness framework, for the purposes of this comparison we need to
theoretically achieve the same policy outcome under both systems. To do
this, we will implicitly adjust the dollar amount of the per-unit charges rate
until total discharges by the industry are equal to the amount allowed

under the permits system. For our purposes, we will not concern ourselves
with the effects of discharges on "hot spots;" we will only be concerned
with total quantity of effluent of biodegradeable material, which in this
case is 750,000 pounds per year.
2. Compliance Costs
The first component to examine is compliance costs. These are the
costs normally estimated under BCA. These are important, but we will see
that institutional transaction costs are also significant.
In order to comply under both systems, mills will first undertake
some capital investment in abatement technologies. Since mills are free to
choose their technology under both systems, it will be assumed that each
mill initially chooses the same abatement technology. Under the
technology-based NELP system, the EPA predicted that direct-discharging
textile mills would have to invest approximately $48 million initially to
51. See id.
52. See id.

53. All data in this table comes from the UNrrED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGec, DEPMENT DOMU FOR EFFLUENT LIMrTATIONS GUIDEINES AND STANDARDS
FOR THE TExTrE MILTs PoIrN SouRcE CATEGORY (PRoPosED) 7, 72 (1979).
54. See Ward, supra note 48.

55. See id.
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comply with the levels in their permits.' According to the author's
assumption, they would invest the same amount under an effluent charges
system.

In addition to initial investments, there are continuing compliance
costs. There is a difference between the two systems. Under the NELP

system, all firms must reduce their discharges. The effluent charges system
will allow firms with lower compliance costs to effectively substitute their
additional compliance activities for those of firms with higher compliance
costs. Under the effluent charges system, low cost firms will reduce
discharges beyond what they would under NELP, while high cost firms
will discharge more. These additional quantities of the high cost firms are
equivalent to the further reductions undertaken by the low cost firms."
This will result in some savings of compliance costs, depending on their
distribution. Consequently, to compute these savings from a charges
system, we need to know the distribution of compliance costs.
From analysis of abatement cost surveysu and discussions with
consultants on abatement technologies for the textile mill industry,"' the
following are accurate statistics for the distribution of compliance costs for
the textile mill industry:

1. Average annual continuing compliance cost expenditures
are approximately $500 thousand per mill.
2. Standard deviation of annual continuing compliance cost

is approximately $100 thousand.
Additionally, from discussions with industry consultantw average

marginal abatement costs are such that if a firm wished to reduce its
effluent of biodegradeable material an additional 50 percent from the
amount in its permit, it would cost approximately an additional 25 percent

56. See PROFOSGUJDEUNM, supra note 47.

57. For example, consider two firms, HC and LC. Firm HC's marginal cost of removing
one pound of BOD is $10 for the first pound, $20 for the second pound, $30 for the third
pound, and $40 for the fourth pound. Firm LCs marginal cost of removing one pound of BOD
is $3 for the first pound, $6 for the second pound, $10 for the third pound, and $18 for the
fourth pound. Under an NELP system, both firms might be required to remove two pounds
of BOD, for a net total of four pounds removed. Under an effluent charges system with the
charges set at $11, HC would remove only one pound, while LC would remove three pounds,

again for a net total of four pounds removed. In this sense, firm LC has substituted its
additional compliance activity of removing one more pound for firm HC's reduction of its
activity by the same amount
58. See U.S. C06M BUREAU, POLXTION ABATM Mr COSS AND ExPMNTURES SURVEY:
CURRENT INDUSTRIAL REPORTS, SmRmsMA200 10 (1993).

59. See Ward, sua
60. See id.

note 48.
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of its total compliance costs. Meanwhile, if a firm wished to increase its
effluent by 50 percent (pollute more), it would save approximately 25
percent of its total annual compliance costs. This is because there are large
fixed costs associated with continuing compliance costs.
To calculate the savings in compliance costs under a charges
system then, the following assumptions will be made:
1. Compliance costs are distributed uniformly around the
mean of average compliance costs of $500 thousand. The
bounds of the uniform distribution will be two standard
deviations away from the mean: $300 thousand to $700
thousand.
2. Each facility emits the same amount of discharge flow.
3. Each facility could take steps so that it would emit 1,500
pounds, 3,000 pounds (the average amount), or 4,500
pounds of biodegradeable material per year.
4. Compliance costs for firms that emit 1,500 pounds would
be 1.25 times their average costs; compliance costs for
firms that emit 4,500 pounds would be 0.75 times their
average compliance costs. This is in accordance with the
average marginal compliance costs discussed above.
5. The time discount rate is 10 percent. All comparisons will
be done in terms of dollars current to the time that the
policies are first operational.
Once these assumptions are made, we can then calculate the number of
mills that will substitute their low-cost compliance activities for activities
of high-cost firms, and the tax rate. Under these assumptions, there will be
substitution of compliance activities by the twenty-one lowest cost firms for
the twenty-one highest cost firms. The full tax rate will be approximately
$74 per pound (which will be reduced by 25 percent for those emitting
1,500 or 3,000 pounds per year). Savings in compliance costs for the charges
system will be approximately $1.925 million per year (approximately $92
thousand per substituting firm). When discounted and summed over an
infinite time horizon, this will represent a total of $19.250 million.61
3. Enactment Costs
We now turn to estimation of the ITC. The first component of these
is enactment costs. We will compare the social costs of enacting one policy

61. One might also be concerned with possible dynamic compliance cost savings.
However, estimation of dynamic compliance cost reductions of one policy versus another is
extremely speculative. For clarity, this estimation will not be discussed here.
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versus those of enacting the other policy. We will see that the enactment
costs of environmental policies are indeed extremely significant and should
be considered in comparisons.
The process of enactment includes two steps: the selection of
instrument, and then the mechanics of drafting and voting on the
legislation implementing the chosen instrument The first step is the same:
to be enacted, each would need to be chosen out of the same portfolio of
instruments. But differences will exist for the second step.
In this case then, enactment includes social losses during the
process of drafting and voting on a particular policy from opportunity
costs of the legislature's time and from lobbying expenditures by interest
groups such as the textile mill industry itself and environmental groups. It
seems that it took the U.S. Congress about the same amount of time to pass
the CWA as it did for the Bundestag to pass the ECL. 2 Consequently, the
variables representing the opportunity cost of the legislature will be
equivalent under the two systems, and these will cancel each other out.
Differences in enactment costs will therefore depend entirely on
differences in lobbying expenditures. Whether lobbying costs should even
be considered is a contentious topic. We will first examine the social costs
of lobbying by the textile mill industry and then by environmental interest
groups.
a. Lobbying by the Textile Mill Industry
To determine lobbying expenditures by the textile mill industry,
we will assume that because the industry is financially better off in one
system versus the other, the industry will spend money lobbying against
the latter.'s We first estimate the difference in the financial effect on the
textile mill industry from one system versus the other. We will then
estimate the percentage of this difference that the textile mill industry
would be willing to spend in lobbying against the less favored system.
To determine the financial difference between one system and the
other, we need to know the total amount of compliance cost expenditures
under both, and the total tax bill paid by the industry under the charges
system. Annual compliance cost expenditures under the NELP system by
the textile mill industry will be approximately $125 million." Total
discounted compliance cost expenditures are then $1.25 billion. The

62.

See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 16, at 873-76; SAX ET AL, supranote 17, at 932-34.

63. It might seem odd that we are treating this industry as a "monolith," where the only
relevant variable is overall industry effect However, to construct consistent estimates, this is

necessary unless we have information on the differential lobbying efforts of individual firms

in the industry.
64.

There are 250 mills spending on average $500,000 each.
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industry would compare this with expected total compliance expenditures
under the charges system. The difference in compliance costs will be $19.25
million.
We also need to calculate the total tax payment for the industry
under the charges system. Multiplying the tax rate times the amount of
biodegradeable material effluent, we find that those emitting 1,500 pounds

per year would pay $83 thousand, those emitting 3,000 pounds would pay
$166.5 thousand, and those emitting 4,500 pounds would pay $333
thousand. These are very high charges.
There are alternative charges schedules that could be used. One
possibility would be to use a combination of subsidies and charges, so that
those emitting 1,500 pounds are subsidized. In this case, those emitting
1,500 pounds would receive $83 thousand, those emitting 3,000 pounds
would pay nothing, and those emitting 4,500 pounds would pay $166.5
thousand. The net annual tax bill for the industry would be about $3.5
million. The total discounted tax bill would be $35 million.
However, the current state of finances for the federal and state
governments would probably preclude any program where the government would begin large subsidies that could possibly increase to a much
higher level as more mills took advantage of them. Instead, a more likely
schedule of charges would be for those emitting 1,500 pounds to pay
nothing, those emitting 3,000 to pay $83 thousand, and those emitting 4,500
to pay $250 thousand. In this case, total annual tax payments under the
charges system will be $22.4 million. The total discounted tax bill for the
industry under this plausible charges schedule would then be $224 million.
For the purposes of this comparison, we will assume that this charges
schedule would be the one used.
To compare the financial impacts, we need to subtract the total
compliance cost savings under a charges system from the total tax bill
Thus, a charges system will be more costly to the textile mill industry by
205 million discounted dollars ($224 minus $19 million).
The next step is to calculate how much of this financial difference
the industry would spend in lobbying against a charges system. Part of the
problem with including lobbying costs in an estimate of the different social
costs of a policy is the high degree of variance in lobbying expenditures.
Lobbying expenditures on some policies will be extremely high, while they
may be very low for others. Exactly what distinguishes between a policy
where expenditures will be high and one where they will be low is unclear.
Some factors that might affect the propensity to engage in lobbying efforts
can include the expected probability of success of these efforts, the degree
of lobbying engaged by opposing parties, and whether there is an industrywide organization that can mobilize resources for these efforts. Also, this
relationship can be nonlinear when the estimated percentage depends on
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the value of the financial stakes. These many factors suggest the extreme
difficulty in estimating the percentage of financial stakes spent on lobbying.
Very little has been done to determine this percentage. However, some
conservative estimates can be made. To do this, one can look at lobbying
expenditures by agriculture on the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFrA).' This episode was chosen because data on both the net effects
on the industry and lobbying expenditures were available." It is generally
accepted that lobbying expenditures by agriculture on NAFTA were fairly
low with respect to the financial consequences of the agreement.67 The total
difference in net exports and net imports expected by the agreement was
$650 million.' Of these differences, perhaps 10 percent can be considered
as profits or losses by the industry.0 Comparing these total expected gains
and losses with actual and pledged expenditures by the agriculture
industry on lobbying (about $1 million), we find that the agriculture
industry spent somewhere between one and two percent of the total
expected financial gains/losses from NAFTA on lobbying. After considering the NAFTA study, 1.5 percent is a reasonable estimate for this
framework. Using a conservative estimate, we find that lobbying expenditures by the textile mill industry would be approximately $3.1 million.
Note that these lobbying expenditures would have been higher if
the proposed effluent charges system did not allow firms to reduce their
charges by 25 percent if they were at or below the maximum standards.
This reduction of the charges bill significantly reduces the total amount that
the whole industry has to pay under a charges system, which in turn
significantly reduces the amount that they spend on lobbying. Note too
that this saving in enactment costs has a tradeoff- the 25 percent reduction
feature of this charges system significantly reduces the amount of
substitution of compliance by lower cost firms for higher cost firms. This
then increases the total cost of compliance for the industry.

65. See David Orden, Agricultural Interest Groups and the North Amerimn Fre Trade
Agreement, MTHE POMCAL ECONOMY OAMmCm TRADE PoCy 335 (Anne 0. ueger ed.,
1996).
66. The author is not aware of other instances where both of these variables are
estimated, and would appreciate any references if they are available.
67. Interview with David Orden, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
Virginia Tech, in Blacksburg, Va. (July 11, 1996).
68. See Orden, supra note 65 at 339.

69. See id.
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b. Lobbying by EnvironmentalGroups
There is also evidence that some environmental groups would
lobby against an effluent charge system.7' These groups may not like a
charges system because it does not stigmatize pollution.' These groups feel
that a charges system would give mills the right to pollute the environment
further just by paying a little more money. They feel that these mills would
take advantage of this system by polluting much more and just raising
prices. They instead want policy instruments that tell mills they have to
reduce emissions as much as possible, or ones that outlaw pollution above
a certain level. They want performance standards like nontradeable
permits. Because they help stigmatize pollution, environmental groups will
support a nontradeable permit system.
The question for the policy analyst then is how much environmental groups would spend to lobby against a charges system. However, their
lobbying effort would be done in the context of a charges system for all
point sources. Lobbying expenditures with respect to the textile mill
industry could be considered as a fraction of total lobbying expenditures
against a full charges system for all industries. To determine total lobbying
expenditures by environmental groups, one estimate would be that five
environmental groups would assign a team of four people each to spend
one year to fight a charges system for point sources. If the average
opportunity cost of an environmental interest group team member is $100
thousand per year, the total social loss from lobbying by the environmental
groups is then $2 million. For the textile mill industry, dividing this total
by the number of major industries affected (50), the social loss from
lobbying against a charges system for the textile mill industry is $40
thousand.
4. Agency Implementation Costs
The next ITC is agency implementation costs. This is the cost that
must be undertaken before those who must comply with the policy may do
so. For environmental policies, this process frequently involves the
researching and drafting of complex regulations, and is consequently very
time consuming and expensive. Comparisons of environmental policies,
thus, should also consider differences in implementation costs.

70. Some groups, such as the Environmental Defense Fund or the National Resources
Defense Council, might support this system. However, for the purposes of this comparison,
it will be assumed that they would not spend resources in lobbying for this system.
71. See STEPHEN KumA, WHAT PRIcE Wcmm
? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
44-53 (1981). However, some groups would support a charges system, such as the
Environmental Defense Fund or the National Resources Defense Council.
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To compare implementation costs between a technology-based
NELP system and an effluent charges system, we will first determine what
steps the implementing agency has to take with each. To implement the
technology-based NELP system, the EPA first determined what actual
water pollutant emissions levels were for a variety of sources. It then
determined what amount of emission reductions would be required to
achieve safe levels of pollutants in most water bodies. The calculations for
BOD are represented in table 1, which shows the BAT effluent limitation
guidelines for various categories of textile mills.' These guidelines are the
permit levels for NELP. They took approximately two years to determine,
and were published in 1974.7
After these guidelines were determined, the EPA then had to
examine a variety of technologies used by textile mills to achieve these
emissions reductions. It had to first understand exactly what these
technologies were, how they operated, and how much emissions reduction
they would generate. Next they would choose which technologies would
become the standards for textile mills. After this, the EPA conducted
economic analyses to support their choice of these technologies. This
process took another five years for textile mills, ending in 19797
In contrast, under the modified effluent charges system under
consideration here, the implementing agency would only have to determine the maximum concentration standards to qualify for reduction of
charges by 50 percent. This is what the EPA did in its first step when it
published the effluent limitation guidelines. Consequently, in comparing
the two systems, this initial step is canceled out. What remains is the social
loss from determining the technologies and supporting this choice, upon
which the effluent limitation guidelines are based.
A good estimate of the cost of doing these additional steps by the
EPA is $1 million per year?' These expenses by the EPA are social losses
because the resources used to do these studies could have been used in a
productive capacity elsewhere. Since these steps took an additional five

72. See Table 1.
73. See UNIE STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROrECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT
FOR EFLuENT LmMTATIONS GuIDE zqNs NEw SOURCE PERFRMANE STANDARDS FOR THE
TEXFLE POINT SOURCE CATEGORY, 1974 (calculation from comparing starting and ending
dates).
74. See RICHARD E. SELTrzER ET AL, ECONOMIC IMPACr ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED EFFLUENT
LIMrrAiIONS GUIDELINES, NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND PREIREATIENr
STANDARDS FOR THE TEXTILE MILLS POINT SOURCE CATEGORY (1979) (calculation from
comparing starting and ending dates).
75. Telephone Interview with George Denning, Economist, Office of Water, Office of
Science and Technology, Engineering & Analysis Division, U.S. EPA Policy Division (Apr. 9,
1996).
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years, the additional social implementation cost of the permit system is $5
million.7 '
5. Detection Costs
The cost of detecting violations of environmental policies is
frequently significant. However, in this case, the two systems involve
essentially identical detection costs. Both systems will have similar selfmonitoring requirements, with both requiring monthly discharge
monitoring reports. Both also will include yearly audits of effluent and
measurement procedures. Consequently, detection costs under the NELP
system will be equal to detection costs under a charges system.
6. Prosecution Costs
The last ITC is prosecution costs, which are the costs of dealing
facilities
that might bring challenges to the execution of these systems,
with
along with the costs of inducing violators of these policies to comply with
them. Once again, we see that these costs are very significant and should
be included in comparisons of environmental policies.
An effluent charge system will have very little prosecution costs
associated with it. As long as facilities report their emissions correctly, and
pay their charges, there will be no reason for the administrative agency to
begin prosecution procedures against them. Some facilities may withhold
their payment in the hope of challenging the authority and/or methodology of the administrative agency in setting the charges rate. However, as
will be argued below, their chances of winning will be extremely slim.
Faced with stiff penalties if they lose, including possible revocation of their
permit, all facilities will pay their charges properly or file for exemptions
under the hardship clause.
Under normal conditions, it can be assumed that 21 textile mills file
for exemptions under the hardship clause each year. We will assume that
a committee of three will spend one month examining these 21 claims, and
that the opportunity cost of each person on the committee will be $100
thousand per year. Consequently, the yearly social cost of examining these
hardship clause claims will be $25 thousand. The discounted total will be
$250 thousand dollars.
Meanwhile, the technology-based NELP system will have very
high prosecution costs. Under the discharge permits system administered
by EPA and the states, approximately five percent of facilities engage in

76. Recall that this difference would not occur if the charges system used technologybased guidelines to determine which facilities would have their charges reduced by 25%,
which is how the FRG charges system operated.
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"significant noncompliance" of their permits.' If these facilities do not
remedy their violations within a few months, the state or federal environmental agency responsible for administration of their permit will initiate
legal proceedings. Shortly thereafter, they will be visited by regulatory
agency staff to determine what steps the facilities were taking to reduce
their discharges. Under the threat of legal proceedings, most would work
with the EPA to improve their performance.
The prosecution costs associated with these inducement procedures are the opportunity costs of the regulators who carry them out These
opportunity costs will be calculated in two ways. First, there are ten federal
EPA enforcement regional offices, each with about ten professionals
working on enforcement of water permits for all industries.' There are also
about 40 states with their own enforcement agencies working on water
permits, again with about ten professionals each. They spend about twothirds of their time in these inducement procedures. About one-half of their
cases are relevant to violations of the effluent guidelines portion of the
permits. After you divide these total enforcement expenditures on
inducement for all industries by the number of major industries regulated
(50), you find that approximately three person-years per year are devoted
to these inducement procedures. At an opportunity cost of $100 thousand
per person, one estimate of the opportunity cost of these inducement
procedures is approximately $300 thousand per year.
Another way to estimate the opportunity cost of these procedures
is to analyze the amount of resources generally devoted to each case.
Typically, you will have about three people working a total of about three
weeks per case." A five percent level of significant violations translates into
13 cases of violations for the textile mill industry per year. This means that
two and a quarter person-years are devoted to these inducement procedures each year. At an opportunity cost of $100 thousand per person, this
new estimate of the opportunity cost of these inducement procedures is
approximately $225 thousand per year, which is fairly close to the first
estimate. This will represent a total of $2.25 million including all discounted years.
In addition to the opportunity costs of inducement procedures,
there are also prosecution costs associated with defending the effluent
guidelines themselves in court. When the guidelines are initially released,
some of the affected firms will challenge the EPA's methodology behind

77. Telephone Interview with David Arent, Environmental Scientist, Water Protection
Division, U.S. EPA Enforcement Division, Philadelphia Regional Office (July 11, 1996).
78. See id.
79.

There is great variance to this average, with each case differing in many aspects from

others. See id.
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these guidelines in court. These challenges have a much higher likelihood
of success than litigation over effluent charges.
Permit levels are based on the determination of "best available
technology" by the EPA. The nature of a choice of a particular technology
over alternatives to achieve a certain reduction of pollution means that
courts may feel that they have the ability to determine whether the agency
has done enough to justify its choice. The CWA statute also suggests,
somewhat cryptically, the requirements for a technology chosen as a
standard through its terminology of BAT.' This terminology gives the
court some guidance for reviewing the EPA's choice of technology.
Moreover, the courts will be less likely to show deference because the
choice of the particular technology is one step away from the policy choice
of how much pollution to allow.
Because all of these factors imply less deference be given to the
choice of technology by the EPA, the standard of review for technologybased permits then will be "hard look review" of the agency's action, under
Ozerton Park.sl Under hard look review, the court will closely scrutinize the
agency's choice of a particular technology, to see whether it has carefully
considered alternatives. This more difficult standard of review means that
prosecutions of violations of permits will involve investigations of the
propriety of the standards themselves, not just the factual question of
whether a mill is complying with permit levels. Technology-based permits
therefore have quite high prosecution costs.
Under the actual ECL, the minimum standards used to determine
whether a facility would qualify for a percentage reduction were based on
technological standards. However, these standards were determined
previously under a different law, and hence might not be grounds for
challenges to the ECL Regardless, in this modified effluent-charges system,
these minimum standards are not based on technological standards, and
are therefore definitely not available as grounds to challenge the charges
system.
Instead, facilities challenging the charges system would need to
question the particular choice of the charges rate. However, charges rates
are more arbitrary by nature-the EPA has to determine exactly where to
draw the line across the wide spectrum of possible rates. While any other
amount could be chosen, in the example of this comparison a rate of $74 is
chosen. The goal for rates might be defined, as it was in the CWA, to make
waters fishable and swimmable.O This is a much more vague goal than the

80.

See SAX ETAL, supra note 17, at 929-30.

81.
82.

See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US. 402,415-16 (1971).
See Brown & Johnson, supra note 30, at 933.

83. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994).
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definition of BAT, and therefore gives less guidance to courts to review
permits. Additionally, the levels of permits are a direct policy choice by the
agency. All of these factors mean that the courts will likely give a great deal
of deference to the EPA's choice for effluent charges, as under Chevron.
This standard of administrative discretion means that prosecutions of
violations of effluent charges will involve only the factual determination of
whether the emissions were properly reported and whether the charges
were paid. The inability to challenge the basis for the agency's decision on
charges should lead to no actual court cases.
Indeed, our experience with technology-based permits shows how
costly the prosecution costs of these can be. Many cases have ended up in
lengthy appeals processes' During these appeals, the entire agency
decision process is analyzed to determine whether the EPA properly
applied the factors directed by Congress. In particular, the economic
analyses supporting the choice of standards by the EPA have been closely
scrutinized."
To estimate the opportunity cost of these appeals, we will
approximate how much time each side spends during an appeal. Based on
experience with the recent appeal of the Organic Chemicals and Plastics
and Synthetic Fibers (OCPSF) effluent guidelines, a good estimate of how
much time the government will spend is four person-years~' A good
estimate of how much time the industry would spend during an appeal
would be the same amount of time as the government, in this case, four
person-years. We also want to estimate the amount of court resources used
during this process. An appellate court typically consists of a three-judge
panel. There will also be one or more clerks working on each case. The
OCPSF industry litigation lasted from 1988-1990.' During this two and
one-half year period, a reasonable estimate of total time spent by clerks and
judges on the case would be three months. The total amount of resources
used during this appellate process would be about eight and one-quarter
person-years. Using the same rate of $100 thousand per person-year, the
opportunity cost of this appellate process would be $825 thousand.

84. See Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865
(1984).
85. See PERCIVAL LT AL, supra note 16, at 896-97.
86. Telephone Interview with Marvin Rubin, Chief, Energy Branch, Office of Water,
Office of Science & Technology, Engineering & Analysis Division, U.S. EPA Policy Division
(July 10,1996).
87. See id.
88. Seeid.
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7. Summary
Table 2 summarizes these comparisons of the technology-based
NELP system with the effluent charges system for each of the cost
components of the ITC framework. From this table, we see that under these
assumptions an effluent charges system is a more cost effective system to
reduce discharges of BOD by textile mills. This is true regardless of how
much dynamic improvement is expected.
However, these results are somewhat sensitive to our rough
estimate of the percentage spent by the industry to lobby against a charges
system. If we allow the industry to spend more than 1.5 percent on
lobbying, our results may change. In fact, if the level of expenditure by the
industry increases to 13.2 percent, our conclusion will be reversed, the
performance-based NELP would be more cost-effective than the incentivebased effluent charges system. Thus, we can see from our conclusion that
an effluent charges system is somewhat sensitive to our rough estimate of
lobbying expenditure levels.
IV. CONCLUSION
Environmental policies are significantly affected by political,
administrative, and legal institutions. These institutions also have very
substantial transaction costs associated with them. Benefit-Cost Analysis,
as traditionally practiced, pays little attention to these transaction costs. In
using BCA, an analyst will carefully compare the compliance costs of
policies. However, in a comparison of the full range of effects of policies,
it may be critical to also consider institutional transaction costs.
This consideration is particularly important when the institutional
settings of the policies being compared are substantially different. For
instance, one policy may place a much larger burden on the regulated
parties, and these parties may respond with intense lobbying against that
policy. Another policy may require the implementing agency to conduct
extremely careful research in developing complex regulations. There can
also be significant differences in the ease of enforcing the policies, or the
ease of defending the policies in court. When these institutional differences
arise, we must take a closer look at the transaction costs associated with
these institutions.
This article presents a cost-effectiveness framework for carefully
comparing both the compliance costs and the institutional transaction costs
of policies. To better illustrate how to use this framework, a comparison of
an NELP policy with an effluent charges policy was performed. Traditional
BCA would suggest that an effluent charges policy is clearly preferable
because it has substantial compliance cost advantages over an NELP policy.
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In the comparison performed here, consideration of institutional transaction costs does not lead to a different conclusion.
However, this result does not imply that effluent charges are
necessarily more cost-effective than NELP. What was most apparent from
this comparison was that these institutional transaction costs are significant. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate these costs, and additional
refinements are necessary. Indeed, one of the more difficult-to-estimate
institutional transaction costs was expected lobbying expenditures. This
comparison used a very small estimate of these expenditures. If the true
level of lobbying expenditures was moderately higher, we would reach the
opposite conclusion-NELP would be more cost-effective than effluent
charges. This possibility suggests that the conclusion reached is sensitive
to underlying assumptions. Thus, more research must be conducted on
refining the estimation of these institutional transaction costs.
Nevertheless, the structure of this framework does aid analysis of
the differences between policies. Even with imprecise estimates, an analyst
can more clearly identify the institutional features that lead to significant
cost differences.
Consequently, in the legislation reauthorizing the CWA, Congress
could perhaps expand the definition of Benefit-Cost Analysis to explicitly
include institutional transaction costs. While analysis of abatement costs is
important, differences in institutional settings should also be considered by
the EPA during rulemaking. Furthermore, in authorizing more specific
policy initiatives, such as enabling the use of permit markets to achieve
reduction in air pollution, legislators themselves would want to be
cognizant of these institutional transaction costs as well. Recognition of the

significance of these costs along with additional refinements of their
estimates will result in more informed decision making by Congress.
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BAT
Effluent
Limitation

Percentage
Reduction

Guidelines

Wool Scouring
Wool

11.7
283.6

0.9
8.9

92%.
97%

78.4

1.6

98%

86.7

2.9

97%

113.4

3.3

97%

122.4

2.5

98%

122.4

2.3

98%

69.2

3.1

96%

46.7

2.2

95%

100.1

1.4

99%

1.9

95%

Finishing

Woven Fabric
Finishing

Simple
Processing
Complex
Processing

Complex

Processing
Plus
Desizing

_______________________

Knit Fabric
Finishing

Simple
Processing
Complex
Processing

Hosiery
Products

Carpet
Finishing

Stock& Yam
Finishing

Nonwoven
Manufacturing

40.1
,

Felted Fabric
212.7
Processing
Table 1: BOD Guidelines for Textile Mills

_

13.4

94%
I

Summer 1999]

BEYOND BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

Cost Component and
Description

Higher Cost for
Technology-Based NELP
System

Compliance Costs

$1925 million [Note: Total
Discounted Compliance

Higher Cost for
Effluent Charges
System

Costs are $1.25 billion]
Enactment Costs
Additional Lobbying

$3.1 million

by Textile Mill
Industry

$0.04 million

Additional Lobbying
by Environmental
Groups
Implementation Costs
Determination of Best
Available
Technologies
Detection Costs
Prosecution Costs
Determination of
Hardship Clause
Requests
Inducement Costs
Court Costs

Note: calculation of effluent guidelines used
under both systems costs $2 million]
$5 million

no difference
$0.25 million

$2.25 million
$0.825 million

Higher Total Cost for $23.9 million
Technology Based
NELP System
Table 2: Comparison of NELP and Effluent Charges Systems

